국제경제
Working Paper
Currency Crisis of Korea : Internal Weakness or External Interdependence?
요약
This paper examines the currency crisis of Korea --- a key country of the Asian
Crisis as well as the Asian Miracle --- in the context of this swirl of the
international capital market. In particular, this paper tries to quantitatively distinguish
the effects of weaknesses in domestic fundamentals from the effects of external
interdependence (called contagion effects in this paper). The following three
conclusions summarize this papers analyses. First, the outbreak of the Korean crisis
may not be completely attributable to the contagion effects alone, although the crises
of other countries substantially worsened the situation. Second, Koreas fundamentals
prior to the crisis were not so strong that economists must have been astonished
with the outbreak of the crisis of Korea, although they were not distinctively weak
for investors to be able to anticipate the forthcoming crisis. Third, if one considered
the structural vulnerability of Koreas financial market in addition to the conventional
macro-fundamentals, and if one could have foreseen the stubborn policies of the
government to cope with financial turmoil, the Korean crisis might have been easier
to anticipate.
Crisis as well as the Asian Miracle --- in the context of this swirl of the
international capital market. In particular, this paper tries to quantitatively distinguish
the effects of weaknesses in domestic fundamentals from the effects of external
interdependence (called contagion effects in this paper). The following three
conclusions summarize this papers analyses. First, the outbreak of the Korean crisis
may not be completely attributable to the contagion effects alone, although the crises
of other countries substantially worsened the situation. Second, Koreas fundamentals
prior to the crisis were not so strong that economists must have been astonished
with the outbreak of the crisis of Korea, although they were not distinctively weak
for investors to be able to anticipate the forthcoming crisis. Third, if one considered
the structural vulnerability of Koreas financial market in addition to the conventional
macro-fundamentals, and if one could have foreseen the stubborn policies of the
government to cope with financial turmoil, the Korean crisis might have been easier
to anticipate.