KDI 한국개발연구원 - 경제정책정보 - 발간처별 목록 - 경제분야 국제기구 - EBRD - Salience and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment

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Salience and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment

EBRD 2020.01.09
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Can seemingly unimportant factors influence voting decisions by making certain issues salient? We study this question in the context of Argentina 2015 presidential elections by examining how the quality of the infrastructure of the school where citizens were assigned to vote influenced their voting choice. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of voters to ballot stations located in different public schools in the city of Buenos Aires, we find that individuals assigned to schools with poorer infrastructure were significantly less likely to vote for Mauricio Macri, the incumbent mayor then running for president. The effect is larger in low-income areas - where fewer people can afford private substitutes to public education - and in places where more households have children in school age. The effect is unlikely to be driven by information scarcity, since information on public school infrastructure was readily available to parents before elections. Rather, direct exposure to poor school infrastructure at the time of voting is likely to make public education - and the poor performance of the incumbent ? more salient.

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